Richmond Public Interest Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 2 General Topics

Article 8

3-31-2022

More Money, Fewer Problems: A Post-Alston v. NCAA Approach to
Reducing Gender Inequities in Sports
Kelley L. Flint
University of Richmond School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr
Part of the Law and Gender Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Kelley L. Flint, More Money, Fewer Problems: A Post-Alston v. NCAA Approach to Reducing Gender
Inequities in Sports, 25 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 153 (2022).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol25/iss2/8

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Richmond Public Interest Law Review by an authorized editor of
UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Flint: More Money, Fewer Problems: A Post-Alston v. NCAA Approach to Red

MORE MONEY, FEWER PROBLEMS: A POST-ALSTON V.
NCAA APPROACH TO REDUCING GENDER INEQUITIES IN
SPORTS
Kelley L. Flint*

*
J.D. Candidate, Class of 2022 at the University of Richmond School of Law. Kelley Flint has
focused on issues impacting gender equity and environmental justice. As a former college athlete, her
studies place a particular emphasis on gender equity in athletics. She graduated from Virginia Commonwealth University with a major in Journalism and minor in Environmental Studies.

153

Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2022

1

Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 8

154

RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV: ii

"As a girl growing up, I was always taught to be so grateful for the crumbs.
Women are taught that. No more. We are only going to be happy with the cake,
the icing, and the cherry on top. We deserve it, and we're going to go for it."
- Billie Jean King

ABSTRACT
In 2021 over the span of a few months, amateurism, the foundation of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association was challenged and redefined. Following the passage of “name, image, and likeness” laws at the state level
and an unfavorable Supreme Court ruling, the NCAA’s structure has been
forced to evolve. These changes have opened up possibilities for college athletes to monetize their playing in a model that is not based on viewership or
revenue sharing. Serious equity gaps between men’s and women’s sports
continue to exist, predicated on which sports generate the most money. While
not a holistic solution, name, image and likeness deals are one way for
women athletes to close gaps in equity.
INTRODUCTION
Of the glass ceilings that remain unshattered, athletics may be one of the
thickest. Reformers are making strides towards greater gender equality across
industries. However, wage gaps, discrimination, harassment, and unequal opportunities for women are prevalent across nearly all workforces.1 Few industries exemplify these inequities more than athletics. For example, media
coverage is the largest money-mover in sports.2 Still, while women make up
forty-percent of sports participants globally, they receive only four-percent
of the media coverage.3 Lack of broadcasting creates a ripple effect for
women in sports, leading to a lack of sponsors, fans, and revenue.4 In addition, there are perceptions that the inequities for women in sports simply exist
because women's athletics are "slower and less interesting."5 The lack of media coverage perpetuates a circular "chicken-and-egg" argument raising the
1
NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN AND FAMILIES, AMERICA'S WOMEN AND THE WAGE GAP 3 (Jan. 2022),
https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/economic-justice/fair-pay/americas-womenand-the-wage-gap.pdf.
2
Joe Pompliano, How Do Professional Sports Teams Make Money?, ROUNDHILL INVESTMENTS,
https://www.roundhillinvestments.com/research/prosports/how-do-professional-sports-teams-makemoney (Apr. 28, 2021).
3
Macaela MacKenzie, Female Athletes Receive Only 4% of Sports Media Coverage - Adidas Wants
to Change That, GLAMOUR (July 16, 2019), https://www.glamour.com/story/female-athletes-receiveonly-4-of-sports-media-coverage-adidas-wants-to-change-that.
4
Id.
5
Charlotte Gibson, Report Finds Strides Made in Women's Sports in Past Few Years, but Inequality
Remains, ESPN (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/28489077/report-finds-stridesmade-women-sports-years-inequality-remains; Travis Scheadler & Audrey Wagstaff, Exposure to Women's Sports: Changing Attitudes Toward Female Athletes, THE SPORT J. (2018), https://thesportjournal.org/article/exposure-to-womens-sports-changing-attitudes- toward-female-athletes/.

https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol25/iss2/8

2

Flint: More Money, Fewer Problems: A Post-Alston v. NCAA Approach to Red

2022]

MORE MONEY, FEWER PROBLEMS

155

following question: Are women's sports not covered because people find
them uninteresting, or are people uninterested in women's sports because they
are not covered? Studies tend to demonstrate the latter is likely true.6
As women athletes7 at the professional level fight for equal pay and greater
media representation, women at the collegiate level face their own set of hurdles to equity. Title IX mandates that every educational institution receiving
federal funding provides equal opportunities—including athletic opportunities—to its students, regardless of gender.8 Since Congress passed Title IX in
1972, women's participation in sports has increased by 1,000 percent.9
The continued existence of gender inequities in sports is irrefutable, as
evidenced by women's continued efforts to advocate for equality in athletics.10 Advocates break down barriers and demand change through public relations campaigns, lawsuits, and individual enterprises emphasizing women's
sports.11 This article explores a different avenue for change by analyzing recent changes in amateurism and antitrust in the National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA") in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Alston
v. NCAA, which may be harnessed to reduce gender inequities in athletics.
Specifically, the article focuses on the developing commercial areas of name,
image, and likeness legislation.
Section I provides context by recounting a brief history of collegiate sports
and amateurism in the NCAA and examines the framework for name, image,
and likeness sponsorships in collegiate sports after Alston v. NCAA. Section
II outlines the inequities and landscape for women in sports both at the collegiate and professional levels. Section III argues that removing amateurism
barriers for women in collegiate athletics can reduce gender inequities by extending revenue-earning years for women in sports; placing economic pressures on institutions such as women's professional sports leagues and the
NCAA; and allowing the private sector and athletes themselves to fill gaps
missed by Title IX compliance. Finally, the article concludes by offering how
6

Scheadler & Wagstaff, supra note 5.
While the term "female athlete" has historically been used in media coverage, "women athletes"
will be used throughout this article. By using "women" rather than "female" as a descriptor, the aim is to
describe both a more inclusive term for athletes who were not assigned female at birth, as well as reflect
the categories collegiate athletics and professional leagues use to distinguish gendered sports.
8
20 U.S.C § 1681(a) (2021).
9
Fast Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=93
(last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
10
Kim Eslesser, Judge Dismisses U.S Soccer Equal Pay Case- Here’s Why, FORBES (May 4, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2020/05/04/judge-dismisses-us-womens-soccer-equal-paycase--- heres-why/?sh=129d0eea728d.
11
Sarah Mervosh and Christina Caron, 8 Times Women in Sports Fought for Equality, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/sports/women-sports-equality.html.
7
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increasing gender equity in sports is imperative to goals of reaching overall
gender equality.
I. FROM INCEPTION TO A NEW ERA OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS
A. History of the NCAA and Amateurism
In the United States, commercialization and competition have operated in
tandem from the inception of intercollegiate athletics. What began as a
friendly competition between student-led teams became a mechanism for institutions of higher learning to seek prestige over rival schools in more than
just academics.12 By the early 1900s, storied competitions like the HarvardYale regatta evolved into sponsored events with such pride and monetary
gain at stake that schools recruited non-student professionals to compete.13
As rosters increasingly filled with athletes who were not students and schools
sought more significant unfair advantages, the need for regulation became
apparent.14 Incremental steps were taken.15 First, the faculty took control of
the intercollegiate teams and competitions, making a minimal difference in
levels of corruption.16 Then, athletic conferences were formed among schools
to schedule competition, provide structure, and create regulations.17 Conferences had some success in reigning in unfair advantages, but, in their place,
new concerns arose.18 With minimal regulations regarding the rules governing the sports themselves, college athletics became increasingly dangerous.19
In 1905, eighteen students died playing intercollegiate football.20 The deaths
and prevalence of serious injuries garnered national attention, pressuring the
government to respond.21 At President Roosevelt's urging, heads of university
programs gathered to create rules and safety measures for intercollegiate
football.22 Thus, the NCAA was born, and since 1910 it has been the predominant governing body for intercollegiate competition, establishing rules for
ninety national championship sports and overseeing 1,098 member
12
See Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association's Role in
Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9 (2000) (detailing how the Harvard-Yale
regatta dates back to 1852 and is the oldest active intercollegiate competition in the United States).
13
Id. at 11.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 12–13.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 11.
18
Id. at 14.
19
Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Death Penalty: How Educators
Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 990 (1987).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Smith, supra note 12 at 9.
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institutions.23
One of the most significant rules the NCAA governs is the preservation of
amateurism in college athletics.24 The original constitution for the NCAA defines an amateur as “one who enters and takes part in athletic contests purely
in obedience to play impulses or for the satisfaction of purely play motives
and for the exercise, training, and social pleasure derived."25 The NCAA's
constitutional view of amateurism is thus defined by an athlete's intrinsic motivation for competing.26 However, in practice, amateurism is defined in the
negative by the activities athletes are prohibited from doing. Most importantly, amateurism in its original form prevented student-athletes from receiving compensation in any form for playing for a school.27
The NCAA's concept and enforcement of amateurism evolved over the
decades since its inception.28 During the early twentieth century, the public's
interest in collegiate athletics increased.29 As money continued to flow, the
NCAA's regulations at the time did little to curtail the scandals associated
with the rampant commercialization of collegiate sports.30 In the decades to
come, the NCAA rapidly expanded its regulations and eventually formed the
Committee on Infractions, which was charged with punishment of memberinstitutions that violated any rules promulgated by the NCAA.31 Simultaneously, in the 1950s, the NCAA negotiated an exclusive multi-million dollar
contract to televise collegiate football.32 Today, college football is a billiondollar industry.33 The success of broadcast football caused a rapid expansion
of revenue for collegiate sports in general.
While highly profitable, the NCAA and institutions saw that the unfair
advantages it aimed to quash once again were rampant.34 Powerhouse schools
23
What is the NCAA?, NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
24
NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2019-20 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1 (2019) (NCAA
Const. art. 1 § 3.1).
25
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Const. art. 2 § 2.9.
26
Id.

27 See Kristin R. Muenzen, Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA 's Version of Amateurism, 13
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257, 260 (2003).
28
Glenn Wong, Kyle Skillman, & Chris Deubert, The NCAA's Infractions Appeals Committee: Recent Case History, Analysis and the Beginning of a New Chapter, 9 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 49–50
(2009).
29
Smith, supra note 12 at 13.
30
Id. at 14.
31
Wong, et al., supra note 28 at 50.
32
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 85–86 (1984).
33 Felix Richter, U.S. College Sports Are a Billion-Dollar Game, STATISTA (Jul. 2, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/chart/25236/ncaa-athletic-department-revenue/.
34
Wong, et al., supra note 28 at 52.
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bribed talented recruits to commit to playing in exchange for cars, money,
promises of special treatment on campus, and other benefits, primarily
funded through "boosters" (donors to the athletic department of a given institution).35 In theory, the NCAA would punish member institutions with sanctions for recruiting and other amateurism violations.36 However, large, revenue-producing universities were disproportionately let off with warnings,
compared with smaller institutions.37 The 1970s changed the structure of college athletics with the creation of the "divisions" (Divisions I, II, and III)
based on the size and athletic prowess of a member institution.38 Division I
schools are the largest and, therefore, the most revenue-producing institutions.39 Each division has differing rules and degrees of enforcement, with
Division I, in theory, being the most restrictive.40 But even among Division I
schools, there were, and are, discrepancies in enforcement.41 As a result, in
1978, Congress launched an investigation into the NCAA after criticism that
the organization was not equally enforcing its regulations, offering leniency
to the higher revenue earning schools.42 The House of Representatives could
not substantiate any findings of improper influence in enforcement, and the
hearing resulted only in suggested changes.43
In 1985 the NCAA convened to amend its leadership and infraction protocols.44 The 1985 changes also caused the NCAA to strengthen its amateurism rules and increase its enforcement efforts.45 Enforcement only furthered
after 1988 when the Supreme Court held in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma that the NCAA
is not a state actor and therefore can take property (scholarships, salaries,

35

Id. at 51.
Id. at 49–50.
37
See Alexander Lodge, Who's Afraid of the Big Bad NCAA: The Ed O'Bannon v. NCAA Decision's
Impact on the NCAA's Amateurism Model, 41 J. CORP. L. 775, 778 (2016) (Division I schools representing
the main source of income of NCAA, which, with reasonable inference, suggests that they are more likely
to get off with a warning from the NCAA than smaller institutions).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Wong, et al., supra note 28 at 51–52.
41
See generally, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE NCAA AND DUE PROCESS: LEGAL
ISSUES (2004); The NCAA and Due Process: Legal Issues John Underwood, It was a trial but worth it,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 9, 1978), https://vault.si.com/vault/1978/10/09/it-was-a-trial-but-worth-itthe-congressional-investigation-of-the-ncaas-enforcement-practices-though-flawed-may-lead-to-neededchanges.
42
Nancy Scannell, Hill Begins Hearings on NCAA Rule Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 1978),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/1978/02/26/hill-begins-hearings-on-ncaa-rule-enforcement/70aebaeb-522c-4043-a6ba-fc28de4f9c83/.
43
Wong, et al., supra note 28 at 52.
44
Id.
45
Id.
36
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accolades, etc.) without raising due process violations.46 Until recently, the
NCAA stringently enforced its amateurism rules, including its "no-pay-forplay" blanket prohibition, which prevented schools from offering any kind of
compensation, including occasional meals, to student-athletes.47 It was not
until the recent Supreme Court case of Alston v. NCAA that the NCAA made
an about-face to its amateurism requirements.48
B. 2021: The Summer that Rocked the NCAA
i. Alston v. NCAA
Before discussing the decision in Alston v. NCAA, the context of the decision should be understood by a preceding Supreme Court case ruling on
NCAA restraints.49 In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, NCAA member institutions at the
University of Oklahoma and University of Georgia challenged the exclusive
broadcasting contract that allowed only the NCAA to profit from televised
college football games.50 The Boards of the Universities challenged the
NCAA under the Sherman Antitrust Act.51 The Supreme Court held the
NCAA's exclusive agreement to be anti-competitive and violative of antitrust
laws under the Sherman Act.52 Though the Court barred the NCAA from exclusively profiting off of the broadcasts, the holding was narrow.
Prior to Alston, there was a general impression among regulators that the
NCAA was considered untouchable by antitrust challenges, as it was held to
a seemingly modified "rule of reason" standard, thus making all its anti-competitive restraints elusive to court challenges.53 The Rule of Reason is a factually based evaluation of an anti-competitive agreement to determine if it
violates antitrust laws or serves a legitimate purpose beyond restrictions on
the market.54 Courts use several factors, including the business purpose of the
agreement, market power of the parties, competition within the relevant market, and other fact-specific considerations.55 The Court applied the Rule of
Reason to the horizontal price-fixing of the television contract in Board of
46

Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 181 (1988).
Wong, et al., supra note 28 at 53.
48
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141S. Ct. 2142 (2021).
49
See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 85–86 (1984).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 85; Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§1-38).
52
Bd. of Regents at 118–21.
53
Lodge, supra note 37 at 779.
54
Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The NCAA and the Rule of Reason, FAC. SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN L. 1, 4
(2017), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2798&context=faculty_scholarship.
55
Id. at 1.
47
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Regents, determining it did violate antitrust laws.56 Horizontal price-fixing is
usually a per se antitrust violation, and no Rule of Reason analysis is necessary.57 However, the Court rationalized its use of a fact-based analysis, stating:
This decision is not based on a lack of judicial experience with this type of arrangement, on the fact that the NCAA is organized as a nonprofit entity, or on
our respect for the NCAA's historic role in the preservation and encouragement
of intercollegiate amateur athletics. Rather, what is critical is that this case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if
the product is to be available at all.58

While the holding in Board of Regents on first reading would appear to
have paved the way for federal challenges to amateurism rules, after Board
of Regents, all federal cases found amateurism rules to be necessary to the
market and product of collegiate sports.59 Dicta in Board of Regents by Justice
Stevens was often cited in the six antitrust rulings following Board of Regents, and until Alston was the final word on amateurism in the NCAA:
The identification of this "product" with an academic tradition differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than professional sports to which
it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor league baseball.
In order to preserve the character and quality of the "product," athletes must not
be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.

The dicta that "athletes must not be paid" became crucial to decisions after
Board of Regents.60 Courts conducted a "blind look" Rule of Reason analysis
under an assumption that amateurism rules were not unreasonable restraints
on trade and that the Sherman Act does not apply to amateurism rules.61
In Alston, the plaintiffs were current and former student-athletes who
played Division I athletics in revenue-generating sports.62 The athletes sued
the NCAA and eleven conferences, challenging their limitations on compensation and amateurism provisions.63 Alston centered on constraints to education-related benefits, such as additional funds for student-athletes to purchase
books or receive paid internships.64 The NCAA had capped education-related

56

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 105 (1984).
Id. at 100.
58
Id. at 100–01.
59
Tibor Nagy, The “Blind Look” Rule of Reason: Federal Courts’ Peculiar Treatment of NCAA
Amateurism Rules, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 311, 340–41 (2005).
60
Id. at 341–42.
61
Id. at 343.
62
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2141 (2021).
63
Id.
64
See generally id.
57
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benefits at a low level and was strict in enforcing its rules.65 The athletes argued that the limitations violated federal antitrust law because, but for the
restrictions, the student-athletes would receive greater compensation in exchange for playing.66 The Supreme Court applied the Rule of Reason and held
that the limits to education-related benefits violate antitrust law, as the limits
restrained trade in the relevant labor market, affected interstate commerce,
and produced significant anti-competitive effects in violation of the Sherman
Act.67 The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff-athletes that the NCAA
could achieve its legitimate purpose, preserving amateurism in college athletics, in a substantially less restrictive manner.68 However, the Supreme
Court’s narrow holding meant it only applied to education-related benefits,
offering no guidance on what less restrictive measures would entail.69
ii. Name, Image, and Likeness
The NCAA's amateurism rules prohibited student-athletes from profiting
off of their name, image, or likeness (“NIL”).70 The NCAA fiercely defended
its prohibition over the past four decades, frequently sanctioning schools and
athletes that violated its NIL regulations.71 The intent behind the blanket prohibition was to maintain amateurism and prevent revenue-generating sports
from becoming de facto professional leagues.72 The sweeping ban met its intended goals to maintain amateurism. However, it simultaneously created unintended consequences and over-enforcement such as NIL rules affecting
athletes post-graduation.73 In O'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, athletes sued the NCAA and EA Sports for using their likenesses in
the popular game Madden College Sports.74 The Ninth Circuit opened the
door for NIL changes with its ruling, holding that student-athletes should be
allowed to profit off their name, image, and likeness while playing NCAA
athletics.75 The NCAA appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Court declined
to hear the case.76

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 2152.
Id.
See generally id. at 2141 (2021).
Id. at 2163.
Id. at 2166.
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, DIVISION I MANUAL, Rule 2.9, 12.1.2.1 (2021).
Smith, supra note 12 at 21–22.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Const. art. 1 § 3.1.
Id.
O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F. 3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
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In August 2019, California passed the first NIL law in the country.77 The
law, titled the "Student Athlete Bill of Rights," directly opposed the NCAA's
NIL rules by prohibiting any California postsecondary educational institution
from "preventing students participating in intercollegiate compensation as a
result of the use of the student's name, image, or likeness."78 The NCAA followed with its own set of proposed rules allowing greater NIL for studentathletes, but did not extend the same degree of flexibility to athletes as the
California proposal.79 Other states followed California's lead, and to date,
twenty-nine other states have passed NIL legislation.80 More states will follow, and NIL will be legal nationwide, at least at the legislative level. Most
NIL laws similarly mirror California's in prohibiting any institution of higher
learning within a state from banning a student-athlete from making money
by leveraging their name, image, or likeness.81 Some states, including Virginia, have opted for restrictions on promoting "vices" such as gambling,
adult entertainment, alcohol, firearms, and tobacco products.82 Beyond state
limitations, schools themselves may also impose more requirements on NIL,
such as prohibiting the use of the school's facilities for any NIL-related activity or preventing a student-athlete from using a school's logo or mascot in
promotions.83 Other than state and institution-imposed requirements, there is
no limit to what a student-athlete can earn through their NIL.84
While the NCAA was slowly adjusting to the pressures of state NIL legislation, the challenges to the NCAA's regulatory authority in Alston v. NCAA
accelerated the policy shift.85 Though Alston did not expressly deal with NIL,
it was the nail in the coffin for the NCAA's unchallenged enforcement authority for amateurism limitations. In its ruling in Alston, the Supreme Court
held that it would apply the Rule of Reason to future challenges against the
NCAA, implying that if the NCAA did create rules against athletes’ use of
their NIL, the Court would strike them down.86 Justice Brett Kavanaugh's
77

CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (2019).
Id.
79
Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Unveils Proposed Rules Changes Related to Athletes' Name Image and
Likeness, USA TODAY (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/11/13/ncaanil-name-image-likeness proposal/6281507002/.
80
Tracker: Name, Image and Likeness Legislation by State, BUS. OF COLL. SPORTS (Sept. 21, 2021),
https://businessofcollegesports.com/tracker-name-image-and-likeness-legislation-by-state/.
81
Id.
82
H.B. 7001, 2021 Leg., 2021 Spec. Sess. (Va. 2021).
83
VCU ATHLETICS INTERIM NAME, IMAGE, AND LIKENESS (NIL) POLICY, VA. COMMONWEALTH
UNIV. ATHLETICS COMPLIANCE 2–3 (2021) (on file with author).
84
H.B. 7001, 2021 Leg., 2021 Spec. Sess. (Va. 2021).
85
Arash Khalili et al., The State of P(l)ay for College Athlete NIL, LOEB & LOEB (Aug. 2021),
https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2021/08/the-state-of-p-l-ay-for-college-athlete-nil.
86
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2166 (2021).
78
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concurring opinion included even stronger language than the majority’s,
demonstrating unsympathetic sentiment towards the NCAA. Justice Kavanaugh wrote that "nowhere else in America can businesses get away with
agreeing not to pay their workers a fair market rate on the theory that their
product is defined by not paying their workers a fair market rate…." 87 On
June 30, 2021, a week after the Alston opinion was published, the NCAA
rescinded its regulations on NIL, allowing member institutions to formulate
their policies according to state law.88 The new policy went into effect July 1,
2021, and immediately student-athletes signed contracts to advertise and promote products.89
iii. Current NIL Deals
There is no national clearinghouse or disclosure requirement for NIL deals
to date, so tracking the exact number of deals or financial details of contracts
is not possible. However, NIL is a widely reported topic, and interviews with
student-athletes reveal some earnings estimates as well as which athletes are
working with national brands. Though numerous athletes simultaneously
took advantage of the change in NCAA policy, the "faces" of the first collegiate NIL deal are Fresno State University women's basketball players Haley
and Hannah Cavinder, who both signed national endorsements with Boost
Mobile and Six Star Pro Nutrition.90 Both successful athletes, the commercial
value of partnering with the twins’ NIL does not originate from their athletic
prowess, but rather comes from their nearly four million TikTok followers.91
With the combined deals, coupled with access to other social media revenue,
it is estimated the twins are earning in the five-figure range.92 Other women
athletes with significant social media followings will also be able to monetize
their social media engagement, including Louisiana State University gymnast
Olivia Dunn who has four million TikTok followers and an additional one

87

Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Adopts Interim Name, Image and Likeness Policy, NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (Jun. 30, 2021), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-adopts-interim-name-image-and-likeness-policy?division=d1.
89
David Cobb, As NIL Rules Go Into Effect, These NCAA Athletes Moved Quickly to Profit From
Name, Image and Likeness, CBS SPORTS (Jul. 1, 2021), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/as-nil-rules-go-into-effect-these-ncaa-athletes-moved-quickly-to-profit-from-name-imageand-likeness/.
90
Ross Dellenger, Behind the Scenes as the Cavinder Twins Became the Faces of Day 1 of NIL,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 1, 2021), https://www.si.com/college/2021/07/01/hanna-haley-cavindertwins-nil-deal-basketball-tiktok.
91
Id.
92
Id.
88
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million Instagram followers.93
Other examples of widely reported NIL deals are what college sports journalists predicted: football and basketball deals.94 Some examples include University of North Carolina quarterback Sam Howell and Clemson quarterback
D.J. Uiagalelei partnering with the fast-food chain Bojangle’s to make appearances and share content on their respective social media platforms.95 Another football player taking advantage of their NIL is Arkansas receiver Trey
Know, who is partnered with PetSmart to start a social media campaign
alongside his dog.96 Football deals also extend to prospective students, including a recruit for the University of Georgia who is reported to already have
an endorsement deal with the apparel company Onward Reserve.97 Perhaps
the largest NIL earner is Alabama quarterback Bryce Young, who partnered
with CashApp.98 Young’s coach, Nick Saban, estimates Young is earning six
figures for his endorsements.99

93
Payton Titus, How Female Athletes and Women’s Sports Can Benefit from NIL, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (July 6, 2021), https://www.tampabay.com/sports/gators/2021/07/06/how-female-athletes-andwomens-sports-can-benefit-from-nil/.
94
Rob Joyce, Notable NCAA NIL Deals, AUDACY: 1080 WTIC NEWSTALK (July 7, 2021),
https://www.audacy.com/wtic/sports/notable-ncaa-nil-deals; Katie McInerney, What is NIL? NCAA Rules
are Changing Regarding Athlete Pay. Here’s What It Means, BOS. GLOBE (July 2, 2021),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/06/30/sports/ncaa-nil-rules-change/.
95
David Kenyon, The Biggest and Most Notable NIL Deals in College Football So Far, BLEACHER
REP.: COLL. FOOTBALL (July 26, 2021), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2946352-the-biggest-andmost-notable-nil-deals-in-college-football-so-far.
96
Wesley Coburn, Arkansas WR Trey Knox Teams with PetSmart in NIL Deal, FANSIDED (July
2021), https://dogoday.com/2021/07/06/trey-knox-arkansas-petsmart/.
97
Mike Griffith, Onward Reserve Sending NIL Opportunities to Brock Vandagriff, Matthew Boling
on July 1, DAWGNATION (June 9, 2021), https://www.dawgnation.com/football/georgia-nil-endorsementbrock-vandagriff/NH7EWX4C3ZEXDBKIDYRKMVPWYM/.
98
Ben Kercheval, Bryce Young Has Earned ‘Ungodly Numbers’ In Income From NIL Deals, CBS
SPORTS (July 21, 2021), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/nick-saban-reveals-alabamaqb-bryce-young-has-earned-ungodly-numbers-in-income-from-nil-deals/.
99
Kenyon, supra note 95.
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The final example of athletes already seizing NIL opportunities are those
who are agreeing to "micro-NIL" deals. Micro-deals are transactions with
lower-pay in exchange for social media campaigns or brand ambassador programs.100 The entertainment company Barstool sports is leveraging quantity
of endorsements by signing thousands of athletes to engage in NIL deals with
the brand, though the company has yet to coordinate what the NIL activities
or promotions will be.101
II. EXISTING INEQUALITIES IN WOMEN'S SPORTS
A. Title IX and Inequities at the Collegiate Level
While the history of college athletics and the NCAA is well over a century
old, participation truly began fifty years ago for women athletes.102 What market forces did to revolutionize and bring explosive growth to men's sports,
federal laws and regulations did for women's sports.103 In 1972, President
Nixon signed Title IX of the 1972 Federal Education Amendments into
law.104 Title IX is a broad mandate that directly responds to the marked inequities and exclusions women face in education settings.105 Consisting of only
thirty-seven words, the Amendment reads:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.106

Despite the brevity of the legislation, Title IX covers nearly all forms of
discrimination on the basis of sex, including ensuring equitable safety on
campus by requiring sexual assault grievance procedures, mandating inclusive school-sponsored clubs and organizations, and providing an equal opportunity to participate in athletics.107
While the language of Title IX is broad, the Department of Education
100
Dan Whateley & Amanda Perelli, How Student-Athletes With Small Social Media Followings Are
Cashing In On the NIL Gold Rush, BUS. INSIDER (Sep. 2, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/student-athletes-making-money-as-micro-and-nano-influencers-nil-2021-8.
101
Brendan Menapace, Barstool Sports Has Signed Thousands of College Athletes to NIL Partnerships, But No One (Not Even Barstool) Seems to Know the Plan, PROMO MKTG. MAG. (Aug. 20, 2021),
https://magazine.promomarketing.com/article/barstool-is-trading-branded-merchandise-for-nil-rights-isit-worth-it-for-athletes/.
102
Richard C. Bell, A History of Women in Sport Prior to Title IX, THE SPORT J. (Mar. 14, 2008),
https://thesportjournal.org/article/a-history-of-women-in-sport-prior-to-title-ix/.
103
Id.
104
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
105
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS OF TITLE IX 6 (2012).
106
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
107
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 105 at 9, 11.
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regulates educational institutions with more specific guidance on adhering to
a nondiscriminatory standard.108 For athletics, the Department of Education
has created specific requirements for schools to ensure equal opportunity regardless of sex.109 To determine if equal opportunity is provided, the Department of Education examines whether the following factors are present: (i)
opportunities and treatment; (ii) equipment; (iii) game and practice times;
(iv) travel and per diem allowances; (v) coaching and tutoring; (vi) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; (vii) facilities; and (viii) publicity.110 Other regulations mandate that if athletic scholarships are available,
there must be "reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of each
sex in substantial proportion to the number of students of each sex participating in . . . athletics."111
Since Title IX’s enactment in 1972, women's participation in sports has
increased at a rate ten times greater than the rate of participation when Title
IX was passed.112 Yet, forty years later, opportunities still lag behind men's
opportunities for women athletes. In the 2015-16 academic year, women athletes accounted for 46.7 percent of Division I athletes while making up, on
average, 53 percent of the undergraduate population on Division I campuses.113 To comply with the Department of Education's regulations, participation in sports should be "proportionate to the interest and demographic
make-up of the school."114 Typical non-compliance of Title IX includes funding disparities, inequal scholarship opportunities, and disparate quality in facilities regarding athletic opportunities.115 For collegiate athletics, disparate
treatment and the demographic make-up of Division I athletes are excused in
some capacity as certain men's sports are "revenue-generating" for a school.
However, very few college sports programs are profitable.116 By and large,

108

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 1, 3. For more on the efficacy of Title IX and the ongoing debate over whether "sex" includes
or excludes "gender" see, Erin E. Buzuvis, "On the Basis of Sex": Using Title IX to Protect Transgender
Students from Discrimination in Education, 28 WIS J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 219, 220–21 (2013).
110
Protecting Students: Athletics, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/pro-students/issues/sex-issue04.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2021).
111
Id.
112
Fast Facts: Title IX, supra note 9.
113
Id.
114
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,399, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86).
115
Anne Bloom, Financial Disparity as Evidence of Discrimination Under Title IX, 2 VILL. SPORTS
& ENT. L.F. 5, 13 (1995).
116
See Finances of Intercollegiate Athletics, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N,
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/finances-intercollegiate-athletics (last visited Nov. 7,
2021).
109
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men's sports, like women's collegiate athletics, operate at a revenue loss.117
Disparate funding partially relates to the massive budgets that revenue-generating sports require.118
While Title IX increased women's participation in sports, gaps in equity
remain. More than three-quarters of the young women who play sports will
quit before playing at the collegiate level, compared to just half of young
men.119 Less than one percent of women play professionally or for a national
team at the collegiate level compared to five percent of men.120 Though several factors contribute to this statistic, the lack of revenue-earning potential
after college is also a driver for women to cease participation. Sports are not
an anomaly, though; lack of opportunity for upward mobility is common
among other industries with high rates of discrimination.121 It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that legal scholars of sports and the law find that sports are
a microcosm for our society's racial and gender issues and often are a platform to bring attention and change to these issues.122
Although Title IX was a catalyst for progress towards equality in education-related opportunities, athletics remain an area of inequity, even at the
heavily regulated collegiate level.123 A contributing factor to unequal treatment is the proliferation of NCAA-administered competition and promotional material, including championships and tournaments.124 As the Court in
Tarkanian indicated, the NCAA is a private actor not beholden to regulations
that affect state entities.125 As a result, the NCAA has a pattern of offering
better championship and playoff facilities and broadcast opportunities to
men's sports, particularly revenue-generating ones, than women's sports.126

117
See DANIEL L. FULKS, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, REVENUES AND EXPENSES 2004–
15: DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 19 (2006).
118
Id. at 21–26.
119
Do You Know the Factors Influencing Girls’ Participation in Sports?, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND.,
https://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/do-you-know-the-factors-influencing-girls-participation-insports/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2021).
120
Id.
121
Mary Beth Faller, Looking at Sports as a Microcosm of Racial, Gender Disparities in Society,
ARIZ. ST. U. (Mar. 30, 2019), https://scrd.asu.edu/content/looking-sports-microcosm-racial-gender-disparities-society.
122
Id.
123
See Julie Macur & Alan Blinder, Anger Erupts Over Disparities at NCAA Tournaments, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/19/sports/ncaabasketball/women-ncaa-tournament-weight-room.html.
124
Emma Baccerllieri, NCAA's Shameful Tournament Disparities Take Spotlight From Where it Belongs, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.si.com/college/2021/03/19/ncaa-womenstournament-unequal-treatment-men-march-madness.
125
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 181 (1988).
126
See Macur & Blinder, supra note 123.
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The NCAA's disparate treatment of women's tournaments garnered national attention during the 2021 NCAA Division I Women's Basketball Tournament, when a University of Oregon player, Sedona Prince, posted a TikTok
video that went viral.127 The video showed that the women’s weight room
facilities were in a partitioned conference room with only low-weight dumbbells and minimal equipment.128 By comparison, the men's facilities had actual weight rooms and private training facilities.129 The national attention the
video garnered also raised awareness about how the NCAA did not allow use
of the "March Madness" trademark for the women's tournament.130 In the
wake of this publicity, the NCAA changed its position to allow the women's
tournament to use the logo and trademark.131
The 2021 NCAA Division I College Softball World Series also made national news for mistreatment.132 The women's teams were scheduled to play
back-to-back playoff games with no rest day, and some games were scheduled to start as late as midnight.133 The women's teams also did not have locker
rooms or showers at the practice or game facilities.134 The men's baseball tournament did not have the same issues.135 The media coverage of the disparate
treatment in NCAA tournaments led to a Congressional probe into the
NCAA's treatment of its women athletes.136
B. Inequities at the Professional Level
Though the discussion surrounding inequality at the collegiate level is relatively new to national media, inequality in women's professional sports has
been ongoing for the past decade. The focal issue is the unequal pay between
women and their male counterparts, which is highlighted by the U.S.

127

Id.
Baccerllieri, supra note 124.
129
See id.
130
Alanis Thames, NCAA to Use 'March Madness' Slogan for Women's Basketball, Too, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/29/sports/ncaabasketball/march-madness-womensbasketball.html.
131
Id.
132
Molly Hensley-Clancy, College Softball Coaches Decry Treatment by NCAA: 'What's Lower Than
POST
(April
23,
2021),
https://www.washingan
Afterthought?',
WASH.
tonpost.com/sports/2021/04/23/ncaa-softball-college-world-series-disparities/.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Molly Hensley-Clancy, Pressure Mounts on NCAA as House Democrats Demand Answers Over
POST
(Mar.
24,
2021),
https://www.washingTournament
Disparities,
WASH.
tonpost.com/sports/2021/03/24/ncaa-tournament-house-democrats-megan-rapinoe/.
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Women's National Soccer Team's (USWNT) litigation and fight for equal
pay.137 The pay structure of the men's and women's national soccer teams is
indicative of a number of common issues among men and women's teams:
while women's sports perform better, they are paid less:
The combined salaries of the 1,693 women playing in the top seven [soccer]
leagues add up to $41.6 million, just slightly less than the $41.7 million salaries
paid to Neymar, a Brazilian forward, by Paris Saint-Germain. [Soccer] in America is unusual because the women's team is paid less than the men, despite more
people tuning in to watch them.138

After the USWNT's collective bargaining agreement expired in 2013,
players sued the U.S. Soccer Federation over gender discrimination in pay
structure.139 Answering the suit, lawyers for the U.S. Soccer Federation argued that the difference in pay was attributed to differences in skill.140 The
brief filed claimed the men's team has a "higher level of speed and strength,"
and the work of the women's team is not equal to the work of the men's national team.141 It also stated that "the job of a [male national team] player
requires materially different skill and more responsibility than [the women's]
job does, while also taking place under materially different working conditions."142 Finally, the brief argued that because the jobs were materially different, the men's and women's pay cannot be compared under the Equal Pay
Act.143 The argument incited national outrage, and the then-president of the
U.S. Soccer Federation, Carlos Cordeiro, issued a public apology, saying that
the brief "did not reflect the values of our federation or tremendous admiration of our women's national team."144 In the wake of bad publicity and sponsors such as Coca-Cola and Budweiser publicly condemning the assertion,
the federation sought mediation to resolve the dispute.145 In 2019, all twenty137
Caitlin Murray, USWNT to Fight U.S. Soccer in Equal Pay Row: Appeal Says Judge's Decision
'Defies
Reality’,
ESPN
(Jul.
23,
2021),
https://www.espn.com/soccer/united-statesusaw/story/4437227/uswnt-to-fight-us-soccer-in-equal-pay-row-appeal-judges-decision-as-it-defies-reality.
138
Where Female Athletes are More Popular Than Male Ones, THE ECONOMIST (Jun. 29, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/06/27/where-female-athletes-are-more-popular-thanmale-ones.
139
Anne M. Peterson, Women’s National Soccer Team Players Sue for Equitable Pay, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Mar. 8, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/lawsuits-ap-top-news-international-soccer-ca-statewire-sports-89de09f63ae14574b38ffb58974dc8b5.
140
Allison Frankel, U.S. Soccer’s Lawyers Learn the Hard Way That Legal Arguments can be Terrible P.R., REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-soccer-idINKBN20Z3HY.
141
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
144
Id.
145
Kevin Draper & Andrew Das, ‘Blatant Misogyny’: U.S. Women Protest, and U.S. Soccer President Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/sports/soccer/uswntequal-pay.html.
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eight women's players agreed to mediation and arbitration to reach a new
pay-structure agreement.146
The USWNT lawsuit argued for equal pay in part because the women’s
team has better viewership and more championships than the men's team.
Other women's sports cannot offer such arguments, especially women's professional sports, which bring substantially less revenue than men's professional leagues. For example, the Women's National Basketball Association
(WNBA) averages $60 million annually while the National Basketball Association earns $7.92 billion.147 As a result, NBA players receive 50% of shared
revenue, while WNBA players receive 20% of shared revenue.148 A contributing factor to the WNBA's revenue is that it is decades behind the NBA in
building its brand, and it is working out labor issues as a relatively new
league.149 A second factor is that the league is significantly smaller than the
NBA, with only twelve teams compared to the NBA's thirty.150 Additionally,
the NBA's average ticket price is between $51 to $89, while a WNBA ticket
costs just $17 on average.151
The relative novelty of women's professional leagues is just one factor that
contributes to lower revenue than men's leagues. Another significant factor
is broadcast time, which brings in the majority of revenue for men’s sports
through advertising deals and revenue. A 2009 study found that men's sports
receive 96.3% of primetime airtime, while women's sports receive just
1.6%.152 The discrepancy in coverage forces women's professional leagues to
be creative in broadcasting to gain viewership, so they have partnered with
streaming platforms like Twitch to allow fans to watch.153 While professional
sports are not covered equitably, the nature of Title IX publicity requires college sports be covered more equitably. As a result, college sports in nonrevenue generating sports have closer viewership ratings, with some sports
146
Kevin Baxter, U.S. Soccer and USWNT Players Agree to Mediation Over Pay Dispute, L.A. TIMES
(Jun. 22, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/sports/soccer/la-sp-us-soccer-uswnt-pay-dispute-mediation20190622-story.html.
147
Doug Robinson, Pay Disparity Between NBA, WNBA is a Numbers Game, DESERET NEWS (Apr.
7, 2021), https://www.deseret.com/sports/2021/4/7/22367915/pay-disparity-between-nba-wnba-is-anumbers-game.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Michael A. Messner & Cheryl Cooky, Gender in Televised Sports: News and Highlights Shows,
1989-2009, U.S.C. CTR. FOR FEMINIST RESEARCH 1, 4 (2010), https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/80/docs/tvsports.pdf (remaining 2.1% of airtime was dedicated to gender neutral or gender
shared topics).
153
Dominic Massimo, NWSL Gamifies Twitch Streams with Sports Buff, SPORTTECHIE (Aug. 11,
2021), https://sporttechie.com/nwsl-gamifies-twitch-streams-with-sport-buff.
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such as softball outperforming men's baseball in viewers.154
III. HARNESSING NIL AND EDUCATION RELATED BENEFITS TO REDUCE
INEQUALITY
There is no one-fit or simple solution for the myriad of barriers to equality
that women athletes experience. Issues such as lack of broadcast time, lower
pay, and fewer opportunities require nuanced responses to address the complex underlying factors that create inequitable circumstances. Though not a
solution, changes to name, image, and likeness rules in collegiate sports may
give women athletes greater agency in monetizing their playing careers. By
removing earning prohibitions from NIL, women athletes will be able to extend their revenue-earning years, potentially allowing sports to be a viable
career that otherwise would have limited opportunities to make a livable
wage. In addition, the money flow at the collegiate level could pressure institutions to address inequality from a market perspective. More significant
revenue potential may pressure media to cover women who are profiting
from NIL and professional sports leagues to offer greater pay. Finally, highearning women's players may rebut the NCAA's argument that women's
sports cannot bring profits, bringing change to championship and tournament
opportunities for women's sports.
The NCAA administers championships for twenty-four women's sports.155
Of those, only nine sports have opportunities for professional league competition in the United States after college.156 Some sports field semi-professional
teams and others offer avenues to compete for limited spots on the national
team.157 For many women athletes, college sports are the highest level of competition available in their respective sport.158 For the over 400,000 NCAA
athletes that compete annually, college sports are the highest level at which
they can compete, with less than two percent of college athletes continuing

154
Clare Brennan, Women's College World Series Tops College World Series Viewership, JUST
WOMEN’S SPORTS (Jul. 7, 2021), https://justwomenssports.com/womens-college-world-series-tops-college-world-series-in-viewership/.
155
Student-Athletes, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, https://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes
(last visited Mar. 16, 2022).
156
See The Evolution of Women’s Sports, OHIO U. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://onlinemasters.ohio.edu/blog/the-evolution-of-womens-sports/.
157
See NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., TITLE IX THE BATTLE FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN ATHLETICS IN
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITIES 3 (2017), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Battle-for-GE-inColleges-and-Universities.pdf; Women’s Sports in Georgia, EXPLORE GA., https://www.exploregeorgia.org/blog/womens-sports-in-georgia (last visited Nov. 11, 2021).
158
See Title IX and Other Women’s Issues, US LEGAL, https://sportslaw.uslegal.com/title-ix-andother-womens-issues/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2021).
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their playing careers to a professional level.159 Name, image, and likeness arrangements allow athletes to earn money for playing during their collegiate
careers, substituting for professional pay that otherwise would be unavailable.160 NIL contracts are not always lucrative deals; sometimes, sponsorships
are small-pay in exchange for social media promotions.161 Even small opportunities to monetize athletic prowess were near nonexistent for women just
twenty-five years ago, but they remain extremely limited. For example, for
some trans women athletes, the use of their NIL in college may be the only
level of competition they can monetize their playing, as certain professional
leagues write rules that bar trans women from competing.162 Allowing women
agency to engage in entrepreneurship and market their playing as a brand
extends the limited years women can monetize playing. Though this is also
true for male college athletes, it is particularly impactful for women, as postcollegiate opportunities to earn revenue for playing are more limited and lowpaying.
Some scholars and journalists contend that the use of NIL may have the
opposite effect on gender equity and only serve to widen equity gaps.163 The
specifics of most NIL contracts are not yet public; however, estimated figures
for several high-profile deals are widely reported. For example, the University of Alabama football coach Nick Saban speculated that the quarterback
Bryce Young is nearing the $1 million mark in his partnership with Cash
App.164 NIL critics worry that male athletes will vastly outpace women athletes, only furthering pay inequality. Though apprehension concerning highprofile deals that would deepen the divide in pay between women and men
athletes is legitimate, revenue-generating athletes account for a small percentage of the more than 500,000 NCAA student-athletes.165 In addition, concerns NIL will widen the pay gap are predicated on the assumption that all or
159
Estimated Probability of Competing in College Athletics, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N,
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-college-athletics (last
visited Nov. 7, 2021).
160
See Dean Golembeski, Companies Rush to Make Name, Image, Likeness Deals With College Athletes, BEST COLL. (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.bestcolleges.com/news/analysis/2021/09/30/ncaa-nilathlete-deals-social-media/.
161
See Menapace, supra note 101.
162
See e.g., Transgender Participation, USA POWERLIFTING, https://www.usapowerlifting.com/transgender-participation-policy/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
163
Amanda Christovich, NIL’s Inevitable Pay Gap?, FRONT OFFICE SPORTS (June 9, 2021)
https://frontofficesports.com/newsletter/fos-college-nils-inevitable-pay-gap/.
164
The Athletic Staff, Nick Saban: Alabama’s Bryce Young Earning Near ‘Seven Figures’ in NIL
Deals, THE ATHLETIC (July 20, 2021), https://theathletic.com/news/nick-saban-alabamas-bryce-youngearning-near-seven-figures-in-nil-deals/bxUbIpB0uPdX/.
165
See, e.g., Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-professional-athletics (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
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most top marketable athletes are men who play revenue-generating sports.166
A recent marketing study found that of the twenty-five college athletes with
the greatest endorsement potential, thirteen were women, with an annual endorsement potential between $466,000 and $63,000.167 The earnings range
was much more varied for the top collegiate men athletes, with the top
earner’s estimated endorsement potential range between $476,000 to
$14,000.168 The marketing survey demonstrates that the difference between
the highest-paid individual athletes (i.e., the highest-earning men using their
NIL compared with the highest-earning women using their NIL) may be less
indicative of a gap than the average numbers of men and women taking advantage of NIL reform.
As women tend to engage with social media more consistently than men,
the ability to brand oneself may allow women athletes to reap the benefits in
greater numbers than men.169 Athletes like Louisiana State University gymnast Olivia Dunne or sister Fresno State basketball players Haley and Hanna
Cavinder, who have millions of TikTok followers, cannot only enter into
sponsorships with brands to earn money from their NIL but can also earn
money from marketing themselves.170 According to a Sport Management Review study, female athletes post more on social media than male athletes on
average.171 While male athletes tend to have more followers, engagement levels show similar figures.172 According to the study, the option for female athletes to use social media creates the potential for a more "level playing field,"
which does not exist in traditional television and media coverage.173
NIL reform may also reduce the sports dropout rates for young players.
By age fourteen, girls drop out of sports at two times the rate of boys.174 Factors include a lack of access to participate, social stigma, lower quality of
experience, and lack of role models.175 Where boys have a number of
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professional players to aspire to become, girls have far fewer professional
athlete role models who look like them. NIL reform could allow young girls
to be exposed to college athletes as role models through advertising. In addition to the monetary benefits of playing collegiate sports, prolonged participation in sports is shown to produce higher self-esteem and health benefits in
women, including a twenty-percent reduction in the risk of breast cancer.176
Another benefit of NIL legislation unique to women athletes is that NIL
contracts may offer control over privatizing equal facilities. As a private actor, the NCAA is not beholden to Title IX regulations.177 Despite incremental
changes to its policies regarding women's championships, facilities, media
coverage, and even the ability to play, problems are not met with the same
voracity as men's championships. Rather than relying on public outrage and
national attention regarding unequal treatment by the NCAA, women athletes
could seek partnerships with private companies to contract for equipment or
facilities, filling gaps the NCAA may legally neglect. Privatization may provide an interim solution while women continue pressure on the NCAA to
acknowledge women's sports as a marketable product.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sports have been described as a microcosm for life, giving rise to the expression "athletes die twice," once at retirement and again at the end of their
lives.178 The sentiment that athletics are life or death is particularly true in the
United States. Here, sports are an integral aspect of American society both in
their impact on the economy but also as a medium to transmit idealistic national values.179 Americans celebrate contributions sports have made in the
past to racial and social progress but simultaneously condemn the voices of
current athletes protesting present inequalities.180 Many of the systemic problems our society faces are under a microscope in athletics where issues such
as racism, homophobia, gender discrimination, and wealth inequality are illuminated by stadium lights and media.181 Because sports is a keystone place
in American identity, the accompanying spotlight will continue to be a
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vehicle for greater societal change.
While name, image, and likeness reform is not a holistic solution to gender
inequity in athletics, its use may offer both real change as well as a symbolic
shift in how Americans view women athletes. NIL reform offers young athletes agency in their playing careers, especially for female athletes who otherwise would be unable to monetize a career in sports. The very real monetary
shift is already taking place as the earnings gap between men and women in
college sports is predicted to shrink. Symbolically, the spotlight on women
and their NIL deals, as well as the deals themselves, may bring a change in
how Americans view women athletes. Economic potential is entwined with
measures of athletic prowess, so much so, that revenue earning, or lack
thereof, becomes either an attractor or repellant to watching sports.182 There
is a direct correlation between the highest-earning athletes and the mostwatched.183 NIL already is pushing media to cover women athletes more as
they sign high-earning deals. NIL also privatizes what Title IX cannot account for. As the NCAA and other private actors, like broadcasters, are not
required to offer equal opportunity, NIL deals may be able to fill in gaps.
Women may contract for their own equipment, or facility sponsors may even
contract with entire teams.184
NIL law continues to develop as states pass bills and universities draft interim guidance for their athletes. The lack of clarity may be a barrier for NIL
to reach its fullest potential as an avenue for equality. There is minimal guidance from the NCAA, and state laws differ in their application of NIL. Uniformity is likely coming, as intercollegiate sports, by nature, are interstate.
Congressional proposals for federal NIL legislation establishing a national
standard would offer consistency for student-athletes. Federal legislation
may change the extent to which women athletes are able to control their ability to seek NIL arrangements privately. If federal legislation is passed that is
more institution friendly, it may limit athletes in non-revenue generating
sports NIL potential.185 Alternatively, federal legislation may codify the existing state of NIL, or even go so far as to include gender equity concerns
within the legislation.
Because NIL is a developing area of athletics and the law, only time will
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tell what NIL reform has in store by allowing women the ability to "choose
their destiny" and inject entrepreneurship into their playing careers. While
the sports industry is still decades away from entirely closing its vast gender
equity gap, even marginal change is progress.
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